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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE USE OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
By Richard J. Tobin * 
In recent years, environmentalists have devoted increasing atten-
tion to the legal aspects of environmental degradation. In many 
cases, they have found that existing statutory legislation is inade-
quate! or improperly enforced by administrative agencies. 2 Con-
cerned with these apparent deficiencies, many have called for a 
stronger commitment to environmental protection in the form of a 
constitutional provision guaranteeing citizens a right to a clean, 
healthful environment.3 
In view of these claims, it is worthwhile to examine some of the 
major issues involved with constitutional protection of the environ-
ment. Although most recent reports consider constitutional protec-
tion at the national level, 4 this article will focus on two aspects of 
state constitutional action. First, some of the predicted conse-
quences of state constitutional action in the environmental area are 
examined. Second, and more importantly, several potential prob-
lems associated with the implementation of environmental declara-
tions are considered. Hopefully, this policy analysis will be useful 
to states and individuals currently relying on or considering consti-
tutional declarations concerning the environment. 
I. FEDERAL ACTION 
Recent Congressional efforts to amend the constitution in order 
to expressly guarantee a right to a decent environment have been 
notable failures. Undaunted, however, some claim that the Ninth 
Amendment to the Constitution already encompasses such aright. 5 
The Ninth Amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people." The argument that this 
language implicitly refers to the right to a decent environment was 
bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. 
Connecticut. 6 In that decision, the Court reversed convictions for 
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aiding and abetting a violation of a Connecticut law that prohibited 
the use of contraceptives by married couples. Mr. Justice Goldberg, 
in a concurring opinion, noted that "the concept of liberty protects 
those personal rights [i.e. the right to marital privacy] that are 
fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of 
Rights."7 In sum, Griswold established the Ninth Amendment as a 
source of previously unenumerated rights. 
Armed with the Griswold decision, environmentalists marched 
into federal courts and asked that Griswold be extended in order to 
secure a constitutional right to a decent environment. In all cases 
to date, however, these efforts to achieve constitutional protection 
of the environment have failed. 
In one case, for example, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
brought an action against the Hoerner Waldorf Corporation,S claim-
ing that the Corporation's pulp and paper mill in Missoula, Mon-
tana, emitted noxious sulfur and other toxic compounds. EDF 
squarely confronted the constitutional issue by asking the United 
States District Court in Missoula to find that the Constitution, 
through the Ninth Amendment and the due process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, protects environmental rights. 
However, the case was dismissed because the requisite degree of 
state or federal governmental action necessary to sustain a suit 
based on Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments was lacking.9 Moreover, 
the presiding judge declined to recognize the Ninth Amendment as 
a basis for an additional unenumerated right. 10 In other casesll as 
well, lower federal courts have refused to accept these constitutional 
arguments, stating the Supreme Court will have to determine the 
applicability of the Ninth Amendment to environmental protection. 
Although constitutional progress at the federal level currently 
seems unlikely, numerous states have adopted constitutional provi-
sions providing for environmental protection (See Appendices I and 
II). Constitutional commissions or conventions in five states (Flor-
ida, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, and Virginia) have included envi-
ronmental provisions in new constitutions, while six states (Massa-
chusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, .New Mexico, Rhode Island and 
North Carolina) have amended their constitutions to provide for 
environmental rights. Thus, some states have completely bypassed 
the need for any constitutional action at the federal level. 
n. IMPACT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A DECENT ENVIRONMENT 
A state legislature committed to strict or lax environmental regu-
lations will do what it wishes. 12 However, a constitutional right to 
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environmental protection should at least inhibit a legislature from 
enacting legislation that would lead to serious environmental dam-
ageY 
Supposedly, a constitution is "the ultimate repository of a peo-
ple's considered judgment about basic matters of public policy."14 
Thus, a constitution should provide a law higher and more funda-
mental than common statutes. Constitutional amendments ordi-
narily require legislative enactment and approval by the voters. In 
all states that have voted on environmental declarations, the pro-
posals have won by overwhelming margins. In this light, constitu-
tional provisions have an advantage in that they probably cannot 
be amended or repealed very readily. 
Moreover, there is widespread agreement that constitutional en-
vironmental declarations can set goals and provide guidance for 
state agencies. For example, the California Assembly Select Com-
mittee on Environmental Quality listed the lack of state goals as one 
of the prime reasons why the California Assembly should adopt a 
constitutional provision relating to the environment. The commit-
tee noted that the absence of constitutional goals and policies had 
resulted in unplanned and uncoordinated efforts to protect the 
state's environment. Consequently, the committee felt the need to 
develop an orderly process to prevent environmental damage: 
To develop this process we need constitutional goals and policies which 
establish legislative intent and the means to attain these goals. Imple-
mentation of these policies will require improving the planning process 
at all levels of government. . . . If legislative policies are implemented 
efficiently, all those whose activities influence California's environment 
will know what is expected of them. . . .15 
In short, a constitutional declaration that guarantees citizens the 
right to a decent environment should also require all state agencies 
to consider the impact of their decisions on the environment. 
For example, Pennsylvania's environmental amendment requires 
state agencies to preserve and maintain clean air, pure water, and 
the natural scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment. 
In response to this constitutional provision, a Pennsylvania court 
recently declared that: 
it is axiomatic that in order to avoid capricious action, a public body 
must give proper consideration to all relevant factors. That environ-
mental considerations have become relevant factors is demonstrated by 
the adoption of Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. IS 
Likewise, the Pennsylvania Attorney General's office has inter-
preted Pennsylvania's constitutional declaration to require that: 
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all county planning commissions, regional planning commissions, mu-
nicipal planning commissions, municipal zoning hearing boards, county 
governments or municipal governments have the responsibility to ascer-
tain the environmental impact of its activities and incorporate appropri-
ate environmental safeguards into its land use plans and related deci-
sions. 17 
Once state agencies are required to consider environmental fac-
tors in their decisions, it should also be possible to challenge agency 
actions taken without relevant environmental considerations. Penn-
sylvania's amendment, for example, possibly creates "rights to pre-
vent the government (state, local, or an authority) from taking posi-
tive action which unduly harms environmental quality," and the 
government "agency could be enjoined from continuing such ac-
tion. "18 
As of April, 1974, there have been several instances in which 
citizens have used state environmental declarations to challenge 
agency actions. In one case,19 a citizen challenged the Pennsylvania 
Department of Environmental Resources (DER) because the agency 
had issued a permit for a sewer intercept without considering the 
full environmental impact of the proposed sewer. The plaintiff com-
plained that DER's failure to consider the effects of the sewer's 
construction on erosion, transportation, land use patterns, popula-
tion density, and air and water quality constituted a violation of 
Pennsylvania's Constitution.2O The state's Environmental Hearing 
Board ruled in favor of the plaintiff and stated that environmental 
considerations must be taken into account. This administrative de-
cision is currently being appealed to the courts. 
In another Pennsylvania case, a court permitted, under the state's 
environmental amendment, a suit seeking to require a municipal 
water authority to give "full and good faith consideration" to ecolog-
ical and environmental factors in site selection for wells and water 
tanks. 21 In this instance, however, the water authority had given no 
consideration to environmental factors before the suit was brought. 
In a third Pennsylvania case, several residents of Wilkes-Barre 
sought to halt the proposed construction of a highway that would 
infringe upon a historic park area. The plaintiffs asked the court to 
interpret Pennsylvania's environmental article in absolute terms, 
i.e., historic areas should be preserved at all costs. The court, how-
ever, upheld the proposed highway construction and stated that the 
environmental provision was: 
intended to allow the normal development of property in the Common-
wealth, while at the same time constitutionally affixing a public trust 
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concept to the management of public natural resources of Pennsyl-
vania.22 
One factor in the decision, though, was the court's recognition of the 
substantial efforts which the Pennsylvania Department of Trans-
portation (Penn DOT) had made to consider and minimize any 
potential adverse environmental impact. 23 
As a final illustration, a number of residents in Louisa County, 
Virginia, sought to halt the proposed construction of a state penal 
facility in their neighborhood. 24 Attempts to enjoin the construction 
in federal court had failed,25 and the plaintiffs then brought suit in 
the state courts under the environmental section (Art.XI) of the 
Virginia Constitution. The plaintiffs contended that there had been: 
(1) no consideration given to the environmental impact of the pro-
posed facility; (2) no proper land use study; (3) no environmental 
impact study; (4) no adequate site selection committee; and (5) no 
meaningful consideration of available alternative sites. 26 In reply, 
Virginia argued that it had specifically considered the possible ad-
verse impact of the prison facility. In fact, the state claimed that it 
had made numerous changes in order to minimize any adverse envi-
ronmental impact that might occur as a result of the construction. 
Although the court ruled in the state's favor, the judge stated that 
Virginia's environmental provision did: 
impose upon individuals and agencies of the State the duty of recogniz-
ing that such [a constitutional] policy does exist. But this duty requires 
only that a person or agency whose actions may affect in some degree a 
State resource which is of a historical nature take into consideration the 
State policy and weigh this together with the other considerations in 
taking the proposed action, or to state the duty negatively, that he or it 
not ignore the State's desire to preserve its historical sites in planning 
his course of action .... 27 
This case is currently being appealed to the Supreme Court of Vir-
gmia. 
The cases reviewed indicate that in those states which have envi-
ronmental declarations in their constitutions, environmental con-
siderations must be taken into account before government agencies 
can proceed with their projects. The first two cases (i.e. sewer inter-
cept and site selection) illustrate instances in which no environmen-
tal considerations had taken place, while in the latter two cases (i.e., 
highway construction and penal facility), the government agencies 
prevailed because they had taken relevant environmental factors 
into account and had demonstrated a reasonable effort to reduce 
damage to the environment. 
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In sum, environmental declarations have not matched the more 
dramatic expectations of their proponents. To date, such declara-
tions have neither eliminated pollution nor redirected a state's 
priorities. On the other hand, if one views constitutional provisions 
as policy statements, these provisions can serve as benchmarks 
against which government agencies must measure their activities. 
III. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH ENVIRONMENTAL DECLARATIONS 
Although constitutional protection of a state's environment can 
have numerous advantages, there are also several problems which 
may arise in the interpretation and utilization of such provisions. 
These problem areas include, but are not limited to: (1) the provi-
sions' wording; (2) the legislatures' role in implementation; and (3) 
the courts' role in interpretation and application. 
A. Drafting 
For the most part, constitutional declarations tend to be general 
policy statements; that is, they lack specific definitions" The United 
States Constitution, for example, guarantees citizens a right to 
"freedom of speech," but nowhere defines what constitutes free 
speech. But, as Joseph L. Sax points out: 
the substantive content that surrounds constitutional provisions like 
those governing free speech or the free exercise of religion, . . . for all 
their uncertainty, incorporate specific historical experiences that infuse 
meaning based on a common understanding within the community.28 
An environmental bill of rights, however, lacks the important ad-
vantage of historical experience. Consequently, the generality of 
most environmental declarations can be a major problem in the 
understanding of such provisions. 
In most current or proposed environmental declarations, adjec-
tives such as decent, liveable, unsullied, habitable, healthful, natu-
ral, unimpaired, and high quality are used to describe the desired 
environment. (Pennsylvania's amendment is more specific, how-
ever,-it speaks of clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the 
environment's natural scenic, historic and esthetic values.) 
Obviously, each descriptive term has a slightly different meaning, 
but each term shares a common element in its lack of specificity. 
In Illinois, for example, the Constitutional Convention considered 
several different terms before agreeing on the standard of "healthful 
environment." According to the proponents of this term, the work 
"healthful" was meant to be a precise, all encompassing phrase. 
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The committee that proposed the environmental article selected the 
word "healthful": 
as best describing the kind of environment [we] ought to obtain. 
'Healthful' is chosen rather than 'clean', 'free of dirt, noise, noxious, and 
toxic materials' and other suggested adjectives because 'healthful' de-
scribes the environment in terms of its direct effect on human life while 
the other suggestions describe the environment more in terms of its 
physical characteristics. A description in terms of physical characteris-
tics may not be flexible enough to apply to new kinds of pollutants 
which may be discovered in the future .... The word 'healthful' is 
meant to describe that quality of physical environment which a reasona-
ble man would select for himself were a free choice available. 29 
Concerned about the absence of specificity in the term "health-
ful," one Illinois Convention delegate asked: "Who decides what 
constitutes a healthful environment? Who defines that term for the 
purposes of the enforcement of these rights?"30 In reply it was noted 
that courts would decide the meaning of "healthful" in the same 
way they have defined "due process" and "equal protection". Re-
cent legislative attempts to define "healthful" indicate that a per-
son's right to such an environment would be violated by any act that 
caused mental or physical injury.3l Thus, medical testimony would 
certainly be required to vindicate one's right to a "healthful" envi-
ronment. Under such circumstances, the term "healthful" could be 
defined by the admission of competent technical testimony in a 
courtroom.32 
Despite the apparent enthusiasm for "healthful," this term is 
probably one of the least stringent words available. It is possible, 
for example, for the environment to deteriorate substantially, but 
still be "healthful." As one delegate commented, this environmen-
tal article would allow Illinois to have "a lake that is technically 
healthful, but completely unusable by the citizens."33 Perhaps the 
most telling comments came during the Convention debate when 
the strongest backer of the environmental provisions stated: 
I think healthful - well, to put the cards on the table, this was the most 
we could get through the committee and thought we could get through 
the Convention. The majority of the committee [that proposed the 
article] just simply didn't feel that words like recreational, esthetic, 
pleasant, clean, et cetera, would make it through the committee or 
through the Convention. 
Now, I would be in favor of such type of language, but I don't feel that 
I should answer for the rest of the committee. (emphasis added)34 
The Pennsylvania and Massachusetts provisions both mandate 
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"clean air" and "pure water." These terms call for more stringent 
standards than would be imposed by "healthful," but neither provi-
sion defines what constitutes "clean air" or "pure water." The Illi-
nois Constitutional Convention considered substituting "clean" for 
"healthful," but the idea was rejected because many delegates be-
lieved "clean" to be too idealistic and too difficult to define.35 
Perhaps one of the most controversial and difficult terms to define 
concerns the environment's esthetic values or qualities mentioned 
in Pennsylvania's and Massachusetts' amendments, and the term, 
"beautiful" which is included in New Mexico's environmental dec-
laration. One lawyer suggests that the esthetic protection of the 
environment should be defined as "freedom from negative or disval-
ued effects upon visual sensibilities."38 This definition however, 
provides little guidance for a judge confronted with the need to 
resolve a case based on esthetic considerations. 
In short, the absence of any commonly accepted standards creates 
an area fraught with ambiguity. It has already been pointed out that 
most courts: 
have been very reluctant to impose restraints on property interests 
merely on the basis of aesthetic considerations. This reluctance is based 
on a strong policy in favor of allowing the fullest possible beneficial use 
and enjoyment of real property and upon the belief, however well-
founded, that beauty is a matter of individual taste.37 
A recent case in Pennsylvania amplifies these observations. The 
controversy involved a developer's attempt to construct a 307-foot 
observation tower overlooking the Gettysburg National Battlefield. 
Previous attempts to halt construction had failed,38 and in July, 
1971 Governor Milton J. Shapp intervened in the controversy. 
Shapp claimed that the proposed tower would cause irreparable 
damage to Gettysburg's historic, scenic, and esthetic environment 
and would, therefore, violate the state's new constitutional provi-
sion. To buttress its case, the state presented testimony from Bruce 
Catton, the Civil War historian, from George Hartzog, Director of 
the National Park Service, and from JWbert Garvey, the Executive 
Secretary of the President's Advisory Council on Historic Preserva-
tion. Each testified that the tower would be discordant with its 
surroundings. In fact, the state claimed that it had presented "clear, 
abundant and substantially uncontroverted evidence that construc-
tion" of the tower "would desecrate the natural, scenic, aesthetic 
and historic values of the Gettysburg environment."39 
In the initial court decision,40 which the state lost, the judge noted 
that neither the environmental amendment nor procedures for its 
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implementation were defined. Upon appeal to a higher court, the 
state was again told that it had failed to carry its burden of proof 
on the issue of whether the tower would injure the Gettysburg envi-
ronment.41 Finally, the Commonwealth appealed to the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court. That court also ruled in the developer's favor 
and rejected the state's contention that the environmental provision 
in the state constitution gave the state broad powers to determine 
what is and is not environmentally beneficial to all the people. The 
court also said that the amendment should only be considered as a 
general principle of law and that additional legislation would be 
required to define the values which the amendment seeks to pro-
tect.42 
The Gettysburg tower controversy may well be an example of 
taking a bad case to court. In effect, the courts were asked to vali-
date a broad policy statement based on subjective statements to the 
effect that the tower would further add to Gettysburg's commercial-
ism and esthetic deterioration. 
In sum, the wording of environmental declarations is of the ut-
most importance. If one believes that constitutions should outline 
a society's goals and that one goal should be environmental protec-
tion, then the strongest possible language may be desirable. 
"Healthful" is probably the least likely to protect the environment. 
By contrast, "clean" and "pure", though vague, provide a firmer 
basis for preserving the environment. At the same time, however, 
the absence of relatively clear-cut and self-enforcing terms will tend 
to increase the need for judicial intervention. 
B. The Legislatures' Role in Implementation 
Nearly all environmental declarations adopted to date specifi-
cally call for legislative implementation. In other words, the decla-
rations are not self-executing,43 and legislatures are expected to 
enact legislation designed to enunciate or supplement the constitu-
tional provisions. On the one hand, some declarations (e.g., Vir-
ginia) state that the legislature "may" enact legislation consistent 
with the constitutional policy of environmental preservation. But, 
all state constitutions allow legislatures to act unless specifically 
forbidden to do so, and environmental provisions "stating that a 
legislature 'may' act often do nothing more than state the legislative 
power that body already had."44 
On the other hand, most recent environmental provisions in state 
constitutions (e.g., Illinois, Montana, New Mexico, Massachusetts) 
command legislatures to pass supplemental legislation. In New 
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Mexico, for example, the environmental article (Article XX, Sec-
tion 21) declares that "the legislature shall provide for control of 
pollution and control of despoilment of the air, water and other 
natural resources of this state .... " Thus, the language is manda-
tory rather than permissive. 45 
Despite this affirmative constitutional duty, state legislatures 
have fulfilled their responsibilities with varying degrees of commit-
ment and success. 46 Illinois provides an illustration of a legislature 
that is either unable or unwilling to pass legislation required to 
supplement the state's environmental article (Article XI). Although 
the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention intentionally delayed 
implementation of one part of Illinois' article so that the legislature 
could pass supplemental legislation, the legislature failed to act. 
Several bills designed to implement the environmental article were 
introduced in the 77th General Assembly (1971-1972), but, again, 
none were passed. Related legislation has not yet been introduced 
in the current Assembly session (1973-1974). 
If legislatures do not act, there is usually no means to require 
action since this is considered a political and not a legal problem. 47 
In the absence of supplemental legislation, it may be impossible to 
vindicate certain portions of constitutional provisions, such as the 
sections guaranteeing Pennsylvania's and Massachusetts' citizens a 
right to the preservation of the environment's scenic, historic, and 
esthetic values. 
Thus, in those states with environmental declarations which are 
not self-executing, the future of environmental protection is up to 
the legislature. Past experiences with environmental legislation, 
however, have made many environmentalists wary of legislatures' 
intentions in implementing constitutional declarations. In sum, if 
legislatures are unwilling to enact legislation to guarantee citizens' 
rights to a decent or healthful environment, constitutional provi-
sions may remain ineffectual platitudes. As a consequences, citizens 
hoping to vindicate their environmental rights may have to move 
from the legislative to the judicial arena. 
C. The Courts' Role in Interpretation and Application 
According to Joseph Sax, there is an important, and improperly 
understood, difference between a right to a clean or healthful envi-
ronment set forth in a statute and one set forth in a constitution. 48 
Although both create the opportunity for enforcement in the courts, 
constitutional rights give courts ultimate authority since legisla-
tures cannot overrule court decisions grounded on constitutional 
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norms except, perhaps, through complicated amendment proceed-
ings. "By contrast, a court enforcing a statutory right (even though 
it may have the same wording as a constitutional provision) can 
always be overruled by subsequent legislation."49 
Although constitutional protection of the environment may allow 
courts to become final arbiters of environmental disputes, there is 
substantial disagreement about the merits of this arrangement. On 
the one hand, many50 assert that the courts are the most favorable 
arena in which to insure environmental protection. Sax, for exam-
ple, asserts that: 
an essential format for reasserting participation in the governmental 
process is in the courtroom . . . because the court preeminently is a 
forum where the individual citizen or community group can obtain a 
hearing on equal terms with the highly organized and experienced inter-
ests that have learned so skillfully to manipulate legislative and admin-
istrative institutions.51 
By going to court, environmentalists can "lay the matter [of pollu-
tion] before the conscience of the community in a forum where the 
conflict can be resolved and evidence tested in cross-examination" 
before an impartial arbiter. 52 This may be especially important be-
cause the judicial branch can respond to massive problems (e.g., 
race and malapportionment) that the other two branches are unres-
ponsive to or are unwilling to resolve. 53 Among the possible advan-
tages of litigation are the facts that: (1) the judicial process is less 
amenable than the legislature to political pressures; (2) courts gen-
erally guarantee access; (3) defendants must respond to questions 
and justify their actions; and (4) courts help to equalize the political 
and administrative leverage of the adversaries.54 Accordingly, at 
first glance the judicial process's apparent advantages seem to out-
weigh the legislative process's advantage in protecting environmen-
tal rights. 
On the other hand, there are observers who suggest that the courts 
may not be an effective place in which to vindicate environmental 
rights. First, some legal scholars believe the judicial to be the least 
well-equipped of the three governmental branches to assume re-
sponsibility for decision-making that can affect such a complex sys-
tem.55 Problems such as thermal pollution and photochemical smog 
have unexpected effects upon the environment-effects which, 
while endangering man's health, have not often coincided with tra-
ditional legal concepts. 56 Courts arguably do not have either the 
staff or technical expertise to evaluate properly the scientific and 
engineering principles of pollution control and must rely on expert 
484 ENVIRONMENT AL AFFAIRS 
testimony to determine the degree to which a decent, healthful, or 
habitable environment is impaired. According to one source: 
The court[sl would have a particularly arduous time assessing allega-
tions that the seemingly innocuous impairment of one ecological system 
will affect inter-dependent life-sustaining processes. Moreover, since the 
basis of such allegations approach the fringes of current scientific knowl-
edge, expert opinion will be speculative and possibly contradictory. 57 
Notwithstanding this warning, some argue that courts cannot delay 
decisions until the results of long term research become available: 
"It will be increasingly necessary for courts and administrative bod-
ies to give due weight to and render decisions on the basis of interim 
scientific conclusions .... "58 Second, courts may reject a citizen's 
plea for environmental protection for many reasons. In these instan-
ces, a court may not even reach the issue of environmental rights 
because of procedural barriers. Third, even if a citizen can bypass 
these potential problems, once in the courtroom he frequently faces 
protracted litigation and must retain counsel of sufficient ability to 
match that of the offending polluter. Coupled with expert witness 
fees and the financing of necessary legal and technical research,59 
the costs of an environmental lawsuit can be prohibitive. 
Fourth, as noted earlier, one frequent problem with constitutional 
provisions is their generality. Because constitutions tend to be broad 
policy statements, judges may be reluctant to enforce environmen-
tal declarations in the absence of specific guidelines provided by the 
legislature. The Gettysburg tower controversy mentioned earlier 
serves as an excellent illustration of this point. The courts there 
believed that injunctive relief was inappropriate because there were 
no standards that could be used to judge the state's claims of envi-
ronmental despoilment. 
In the absence of specific guidelines, courts may also be reluctant 
to intervene in the administrative process. Even when an adminis-
trative agency is subject to judicial review, the scope of review is 
usually "limited to whether there has been a manifest abuse of 
discretion, and absent such a finding, [courts] will not substitute 
judicial discretion for administration even though the court might, 
upon initial consideration, have reached a different result .... "60 
Another problem with the absence of specific guidelines is that 
courts "may only parrot agency expertise, no matter how erroneous 
or inadequate the conclusions that expertise may have fostered."61 
Moreover, incautious litigation may set poor precedents and may 
seriously jeopardize the progress of environmental reform. 62 
The preceding discussion has not resolved the debate over the 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS 485 
courts' role in the interpretation and utilization of environmental 
declarations. In fact, the discussion offers more questions than an-
swers. What it does indicate, however, is that courts need guidelines 
before they can properly act. It is the legislatures' responsibility to 
provide this guidance; and, once guidance is provided, it should be 
possible for courts to judge environmental disputes in a relatively 
clear-cut manner. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has attemped to summarize briefly some of the major 
consequences and problems associated with constitutional protec-
tion of the environment. Few such constitutional provisions have 
matched all expectations, but their future usefulness may be far-
ranging in preventing senseless environmental degradation. How-
ever worded, environmental provisions state public policies. These 
policies frequently conflict with the traditional legal view that pol-
lution is often an inevitable consequence of economic and industrial 
progress. At the least, constitutional declarations should alter these 
biases since environmental provisions mandate consideration of 
environmental factors. In other words, when state courts apply their 
traditional balancing of interests, they must now include environ-
mental concerns in the scales. Thus, constitutional provisions may 
tip the scales in favor of environmental protection at the expense of 
unrestrained industrial development. 
Environmental declarations, useful as they may be, also intro-
duce certain problems such as the interpretation of their wording 
and the courts' and legislatures' role in implementation. As with 
other constitutional articles, the problems of environmental provi-
sions will have to be refined and resolved through legislation and 
through judicial interpretation. Only in this manner will such provi-
sions obtain the constitutional gloss necessary to be truly effective. 
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Appendix I 
States with Environmental "Bills of Rights" 
Section of Method of 
State Constitution Adoption * Effective Date 
Florida Art. II, Sec. 7 LE Jan. 7, 1969 
Illinois Art. XI CC Jan. 1, 1972 
Massach usetts Art. 97 of the LE Nov. 7,1972 
Amendments 
Michigan Art. IV, Sec. 52 CC Jan. 1, 1964 
Montana Art. XI CC July 1, 1973 
New Mexico Art. XX, Sec. 21 LE Nov. 2, 1971 
New York Art. XIV LE Jan. 1, 1970 
North Carolina Art. XIV, Sec. 5 LE July 1, 1973 
Pennsylvania Art. I, Sec. 27 LE May 18, 1971 
Rhode Island Art. I, Sec. 17 LE Nov. 3, 1970 
Virginia Art. XI LE July 1, 1971 
*CC - Constitutional Convention and Popular Vote 
LE - Constitutional Commission, Legislative Enactment and Popular Vote 
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Appendix II 
Text of Selected Environmental "Bills of Rights" 
Pennsylvania (Art. I, Sec. 27) 
487 
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the 
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's 
public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including 
generations yet to come. As a trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall 
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people. 
Illinois (Art. XI) 
Sec. 1. The public policy of the State and the duty of each person is to provide 
and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future genera-
tions. The General Assembly shall provide by law for the implementation and 
enforcement of this public policy. 
Sec. 2. Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may 
enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate 
legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation by law. 
New York (Art. XIV, Sec. 4 and 5) 
Sec. 4. The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural re-
sources and scenic beauty and encourage the development and improvement of its 
agricultural lands for the production of food and other agricultural products. The 
legislature, in implementing this policy, shall include adequate provision for the 
abatement of air and water pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise, the 
protection of agricultural lands, wetlands and shorelines, and the development and 
regulation of water resources. The legislature shall further provide for the acquisi-
tion of lands and waters, including improvements thereon and any interest therein, 
outside the forest preserve counties, and the dedication of properties so acquired 
or now owned, which because of their natural beauty, wilderness character, or 
geological, ecological or historical significance, shall be preserved and administered 
for the use and enjoyment of the people. Properties so dedicated shall constitute 
the state nature and historical preserve and they shall not be taken or otherwise 
disposed of except by law enacted by two successive regular sessions of the legisla-
ture. 
Sec. 5. A violation of any of the provisions of this article may be restrained at the 
suit of the people or, with the consent of the supreme court in appellate division, 
on notice to the attorney general at the suit of any citizen. 
New Mexico (Art. XX, Sec. 21) 
The protection of the state's beautiful and healthful environment is hereby de-
clared to be of fundamental importance to the public interest, health, safety and 
the general welfare. The legislature shall provide for control of pollution and control 
of despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this state, consistent 
with the use and development of these resources for the maximum benefit of the 
people. 
North Carolina (Art. XIV, Sec. 5)$ 
It shall be the policy of this State to conserve and protect its lands and waters 
for the benefit of all its citizenry, and to this end it shall be a proper function of 
the State of North Carolina and its political subdivisions to acquire and preserve 
park, recreational, and scenic areas, to control and limit the pollution of our air 
and water, to control excessive noise, and in every other appropriate way to pre-
serve as a part of the common heritage of this State its forests, wetlands, estuaries, 
beaches, historical sites, openlands, and places of beauty. 
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To accomplish the aforementioned public purposes, the State and its counties, 
cities and towns, and other units of local government may acquire by purchase or 
gift properties or interests in properties which shall, upon their special dedication 
to and acceptance by resolution adopted by a vote of three-fifths of the members 
of each house of the General Assembly for those public purposes, constitute part 
of the 'State Nature and Historic Preserve', and which shall not be used for other 
purposes except as authorized by law enacted by a vote of three-fifths of the 
members of each house of the General Assembly. The General Assembly shall 
prescribe by general law the conditions and procedures under which such properties 
or interests therein shall be dedicated for the aforementioned public purposes. 
Massachusetts (Art. 97 of the Amendments) 
The people shall have the right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive 
and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of 
their environment; and the protection of the people in their right to the conserva-
tion, development and utilization ofthe agricultural, mineral, forest, water, air and 
other natural resources is hereby declared to be a public purpose. 
The general court shall have the power to enact legislation necessary or expedient 
to protect such rights. 
In the furtherance of the foregoing powers, the general court shall have the power 
to provide for the taking, upon payment of just compensation therefor, or for the 
acquisition by purchase or otherwise, of lands and easements or such other interests 
therein as may be deemed necessary to accomplish these purposes. 
Lands and easements taken or acquired for such purposes shall not be used for 
other purposes or otherwise disposed of except by laws enacted by a two thirds vote, 
taken by yeas and nays, of each branch of the general court. 
Virginia (Art. XI) 
Sec. 1. Natural resources and historical sites of the Commonwealth. 
To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment 
for recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, it shall 
be the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural 
resources, its public lands, and its historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall 
be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general wel-
fare of the people of the Commonwealth. 
Sec. 2. Conservation and development of natural resources and historical sites. 
In the furtherance of such policy, the General Assembly may undertake the 
conservation, development, or utilization of lands or natural resources of the Com-
monwealth, the acquisition and protection of historical sites and buildings, and the 
protection of its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or 
destruction, by agencies of the Commonwealth or by the creation of public authori-
ties, or by leases or other contracts with agencies of the United States, with other 
states, with units of government in the Commonwealth, or with private persons or 
corporations. . . . 
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